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numa Teifu — viewed Japan's expansion to the Philippines as 
part of their country's expansion to Nanyo (the Southern Seas). 
The underlying justification of all their plans, especially that of 
Yoka Tosaku, was Japan's need of the Philippines as an outlet 
for her "surplus population/' This justification implied or was 
followed by expressions of hopes for the consequent development 
of trade with the Philippines, a country engaged in agricultural 
production of food and agricultural cash crops then thought of 
by the Japanese nationalist-activists as two of Ja[)anT needs vis a 
vis their claim of a growing population and increasing industrial-
ization. Sugiura Jugo underscored Japan's mission of civilizing 
and/or aiding backward areas of the world especially a neighbour 
— that is, the Philippines — as the main argument for Japanese 
expansion to the Islands. Suganuma Teifu and Fukumoto Nichi-
nan realized the need of such help but justified it in terms of 
Japan's right to preventive self-defense. Of the four Japanese, 
only Suganuma Teifu and Fukumoto Makoto took steps towards 
the realization of their plans. 
T o make the plans of these four Japanese-activists for Japan's 
expansion to the Philippines significant and relevant to the deve-
lopment of Japanese activities in the Philippines before the last 
Pacific War, I would like to pose two questions: (1) Could there 
be a possibility of viewing twentieth century Japanese activities 
in the Philippines as inspired by any of the four plans for Japan's 
expansion to the Islands? (2) Could a link be established between 
the techniques used by the Japanese in founding an agricultural 
settlement in Davao with those suggested by Yoko Tosaku? T o 
answer these questions, there is a need of undertaking further 
basic research of sources written not only in Japanese but also in 
other languages such as those written in English by the American 
Philippine administrators and perhaps those written by foreign 
consuls assigned to the Philippines. But even if these questions 
would remain unanswered, ^ e plans of these four Japanese 
nationalist-activists — Yoko Tosaku, Sugiura Jugo, Suganuma Teifu 
and Fukumoto Makoto —have indicated that during the last tw^ o 
decades of the nineteenth century, there were Japanese who 
thought of the possibility of Japan's expansion to the Philippines. 
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SIAM AND LAOS, 1767 — 1827^  
\ 
DAVID K . W Y A T T 
In January of 1827 Chao Anu, the ruler of the Lao state of 
Vientiane, led his armies in a rapid and unopposed march across 
the Khorat Plateau of Northeast Siam in a sudden attack on his 
suzerain, the third king of Thailand's Chakri Dynasty. Reacting 
to Anu's presence only in late February when the Lao vanguard 
reached Saraburi, three days' march from Bangkok, the Thai soon 
mounted a counter attack which scattered and expelled the Lao 
forces. X^e sack and complete destruction of Vientiane followed, 
together with a massive resettlement of Lao people on what is 
now the Thai side of the Mekong, and in the next few years tlie 
Thai brought all the former Vientiane territories under direct 
administration.^ 
The drama of the 1827 rebellion has in many historical accounts 
over-shadowed the important sixty-year period which preceded it 
and provided the conditions under which it occurred. The object 
of this paper is to consider this period and distinguish within it 
a number of elements and events which contributed to the event-
ual outbreak of rebellion, as well as to attempt to throw some 
light on a neglected period in the histories of Siam and Laos. This 
study is based primarily on printed Thai sources, particularly the 
chronicles of the three major Lao states of this period (Luang 
Prabang, Vientiane, and Champasak) and the first three reigm of 
the Chakri Dynasty, and several collections of Thai documents. 
With these relatively limited sources, only tentative conclusions 
may be urged, particularly as so few Lao documents for this 
period are available. Their main import, however, is nonethe-
less clear: the Vientiane rebellion had its roots in a long period 
of increasingly activc Thai involvement in Lao affairs. 
• Part of the study resulting in this article was accomplished under fellowships 
granted by the Ford Foundation and the Foreign Area Fellowship Program. 
V, However, the conclusions, opinions, and other statements in this article are 
those of the author and are not necessarily those of tlie Ford Foundation or 
the Foreign Area Fellowship Program. 
1. A good account of the Vientiane Rebellion may be found in Walter Vella, Sinm 
Under Rama III (Locust Valley, N.Y., 1957), 80 ff. ^ 
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SIAM AND LAOS 
I. The First Thai hwasion of Vientiane, 1778-1779. 
^ The most important ingredient in the events of the 1770's in 
Laos was the continuing struggle between Siam and Burma, which 
did not diminish in intensity in the decade following the Burmese 
sack of Ayuthia in 176?" In order both to strengthen their own 
forces and to deny strength to their enemy, each side became in-
,yolved in Lao affairs. The opportunities for both sides were 
heightened by the deep-seated hostility which existed in the rela-
tions between the Lao states themselves, a product of the dynastic 
schism of the first decade of the century which had resulted in the 
division of the Kingdom of Lan Chang, and had been aggravated 
further by Burmese interference, in particular, in Lao affairs.^ 
There were thus two major kingdoms with which alliances could 
be sought, and an alliance made with one of the two would tend 
to throw the other into an alliance with the opposing side. 
Two other elements important in the history of this period 
should also be mentioned. First, continued Burmese involvement 
in Laos depended upon their easy access to Laos, which was possi-
ble only so long as the Burmese retained a foothold in the Chieng-
mai area. When the Burmese finally lost Chiengmai for the 
last time in 1798, their influence in Laos came to an end; and, in 
practice, their activities in Laos were limited from the mid-1770 s.® 
Secondly, one should note in the following paragraphs the poli-
tical effects of Laos' geographical position, which in the end made 
its continued existence dependent on the will of its neighbours. 
In preparation for the final massive attack on Ayuthia, the 
Burmese commander at Chiengmai attacked Luang Prabang in 
1764, aided by an army from Vientiane. In addition to many 
horses, elephants, and supplies for war, the Burmese also carried 
off one of the king's younger brothers as security for the treaty 
they obtained, and at the same time concluded an alliance with 
^Vientiane. The prince later escaped, and returned to Luang 
# Prabang to be crowned as King Tiao Vongsa. This king set 
about, early in the seventies, to settle his score with Vientiane.* 
Impressed with renascent Siam, fearful of a vengeful Luang 
;. Paul le Boulanger, Histoire du Laos Francais (Paris, 1931) mentions no Tha i 
involvement in Laos in the 18th century until after 1767. 
1 . Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, Thai rop phama [Thai Wars Wi th Burma] 
(Bangkok, 1962). 639, 784. 
. Phraya Pramuan W^ichaphun, Phongsawadan muang lan chang [Chronicles of 
I ^ n Chang] (2nd.ed., Bangkok, 1941), 56-7, gives a clear account of this expedi-
tion, but dates it in 1756; while Prince Narathip Praphan, Phraraichaphongsa-
wadan phama [Royal Chronicles of Burma] (Bangkok, 1962), 11, 117-8, gives 
1766. I follow here Prince Damrong's Thai rop phama, 336, which shows 
evidence of having sifted all the relevant sources ~ Lao, Burmese, and Thai . 
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Prabang, and aware tliat the Burmese, occupied with both Siani 
and China, could be o£ no assistance. King Siribunyasan of Vien-
tiane bid for an alliance with Siam in a letter written on 6 April 
1770. King Taksin of Thonburi responded favourably and in 
April of 1771 wrote to confirm the pact and told Siribunyasan to 
remember that "your enemies will be considered as our own." 
Explaining that he was moving troops up to Chiengmai, he sug-
gested that a present of 300 horses would be greatly appreciated.^ 
In his commentary on a major document of this period, King 
Chulalongkorn expressed some doubt as to Taksin's motives- in 
this correspondence. Taksin, he thought, was not adverse to 
opening friendly relations with Vientiane on a basis of equality 
only because he intended to bring Vientiane under Thai control 
in due course. He had no real hopes of obtaining horses from 
Vientiane, and was not truly interested in adding Siribunyasan's 
daughter to his household, although he suggested he would accept 
her. His was but a single goal: to strengthen Siam.® In the 
course of events which followed, such a policy is well in evidence. 
This correspondence was inteiTupted by new warfare. The 
Burmese, by the Kaungton Treaty of 1770, put an end to their 
war with China and again turned their intefrests to the East.' 
Shortly thereafter, early in 1771, Luang Prabang launched its 
attack of revenge against Vientiane, and laid siege to the city for 
two months.® Beleaguered in his capital. King Siribunyasan 
appealed, not to the Siamese, who were again on the defensive, 
but to the Burmese, who quickly sent 5000 troops from Chieng-
mai under the command 9f the famous general Posuphala to at-
tack Luang Prabang from the rear.® Apparently the Luang Pra-
bang army was warned of the approach of the Burmese, for they 
hastily retreated home and held off the enemy for fifteen days. 
The outcome of the battle is not clear. While some sources 
state or imply that the city was taken and sacked,^ ® others indicate 
5. 
6. 
9. 
10. 
Texts of these and succeeding letters are translated in Maha Sila Viravong, 
History of Laos (mimeo., New York, 1958), 87 ff. 
King Chulalongkorn, Chotmaihet khwamsongcham khong krommaluang narin-
thewi.. .lae phraratchawitchan nai phrahat somdet phra chunlachomhlao chaoyu-
hua [Memoirsx>l Princess Narinthewi, With Commentary by King Chulalongkorn] 
(Bangkok. 1958), 131-2. 
D. G. E. Hall, Burma, (3rd ed., London, 1960), 91. 
Thailand, Krom Sinlapakon, comp,, "Phongsawadan, muang luang phrabang 
[Chronicles of Luang Prabang]," in Prachum Phongsawadan [Collected Chronicles], 
vol. 11 (Bangkok, 1919), 41. Cited hereafter as PMLP. 
Maha Sila, 89. The Luang Prabang chronicles state that Vientiane solicited aid 
directly from Ava; but Posuphala l\'as commander of Burmese forces at Chieng-
mai. the only Burmese troops, in all probability, which could have come to 
Vientiane's rescue in time. This is borne out in the annals of Chiengmai, as 
presented by Phraya Prachakit Korachak, Phongsawadan yonok [Chroniclcs of 
Yonok] (Bangkok, 1961), 4.72. 
Le Boulanger, 155, 196. 
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that concern for their position at Chiengniai in the face of a 
Siamese attack forced the Burmese to retreat, leaving Luang Pra-
bang under a negotiated peace a vassal of Burma.^ ^ 
When King Siribunyasan ascended the throne of Vientiane,^^ 
his claim was supported by two officials of the Kingdom, named 
Wo and Ta. These two personages came in the succeeding 
years to figure in the history not, only of Vientiane, but also of 
Champasak, several present-day provincial capitals- in the Thai 
Northeast, and Siam as well. Out of a mass of legends in nearly 
twenty versions of their story, the following sequence of events 
emerges, albeit none too clearly. 
Wo and Ta, in return for their efforts on behalf of Siribunya-
san's claim, to the throne, asked for the honour of being appointed 
to high state position, but as they were not of royal blood, Siri-
bunyasan refused them. They then left Vientiane and went across 
the Mekong to Nong Bua Lamphu, near Udorn in Northeast 
Thailand, where they founded their own independent principality. 
One version of the tale states that they were further offended 
when Siribunyasan asked for the hand of Ta's daughter as a 
common concubine.^^ In any event, out of their own frustrated 
political ambitions and Siribunyasan's desire to eliminate his 
rivals, matters soon came to a head. After three years of inter-
mittent warfare between Vientiane and Nong Bua Lamphu, Wo 
and Ta finally appealed to the Burmese for aid. A Burmese force 
was sent from Chiengmai to help them, but was intercepted en 
route and persuaded by Siribunyasan's envoys to attack Nong 
Bua Lamphu. In a brief encounter with joint Burmese-Vientiane 
forces, Ta was killed and the town taken, while Wo managed to 
escape to Champasak with some of his followers. The Burmese 
forces returned to Chiengmai, carrying with them some of Siri-
bunyasan's children and court officials as hostages against Vien-
11. FMLP, H; and Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, ed., "Phongsawadan muang luang 
phrabang [Chronicles of * Luang Prabang]," in Collected Chronicles, vol. 5 
(Bangkok, iyJ5), 254. Cited hereafter as Danirong-PMLP. Phraya Prachakit, 
47S, states that a Siamese attack in the Chiengmai area caused the sudden Bur-
mese withdrawal from Luang Prabang. ' 
12. For the date of the accession of Siribunyasan, Le Boulanger gives 1760, as 
docs History of Laos (mimeo, Bangkok, 1961), 58, 64. On the other hard, 
Phraya Pramuan, 36; Yim Punthayangkura, "I^mdap ratchawong kasat haeng 
^ prathet lao [Geneological Table of the Kings of Laos]," Sinlapakon 6:3 (Sept. 
^^ 1962), suppl.; and Berval, 41, give 1767. Charles Archaimbault, in an admir-
able study of "Histoire de Campasak," Journal Asiatique t. CCXLIX, fasc. 4 
(1961), 558, indicates that the Wo-Ta tale related below could have taken 
^ place following the accession of Siribunyasan's predecessor in 1741. I am most 
, 5 grateful to M. Archaimbault for his kindness in discussing this article with 
me, although for the judgments expressed here I alone am, of course, responsi-
1 ible. ^ 
15. Toem Singhathit, Fang khioa maenam khong [Right Bank of the Mekong River] 
(Bangkok, 1956), I, 141. 
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tiane's good belkudour during a projected invasion of Siam. It 
appears that at this time the Burmese asked Vientiane to attack 
Naklion Ratchasima (Khorat) in conjunction with this invasion." 
When Taksin attacked Chiengmai in 1774, he discovered some 
Lao officials among the Burmese forces and sent off a blistering 
protest message to Vientiane.^^ Carried to Vientiane by six envoys, 
the letter complained that Vientiane had not lived up to the treaty 
with Siam, and threatened that Taksin would be compelled to 
attack Vientiane unless Siribunyasan sent food supplies for the 
current campaign against Burma, together with a Lao contingent 
to fight on the Thai side. ^ 
In his reply, written on 23 March 1775,^ ® Siribunyasan protested 
that he had done his best to live up to the treaty, but that he 
had been compelled to aid the Burmese because they held some of 
his children and officials as hostages. He promised to observe the 
treaty as fully as possible, but explained that he could do so only 
covertly until the hostages were returned, and asked that Siam 
give assistance to any of them that might escape through Siam. 
Siribunyasan's reply to Taksin's protest was accompanied by 
corroborating messages written by high court officials and the 
Supreme Patriarch of the Lao Buddhist order. Taksin's reply, 
written on 31 May 1775, was more conciliatory. The threat to 
invade Vientiane was withdrawn, since a captured Burmese officer 
had corroborated Siribunyasan's excuses; and Taksin expressed his 
desire —in the spirit of the treaty of 1771 —to take revenge on 
Burma for its poor treatment'of Vientiane. For such an expedi-
tion, however, Taksin stated that he needed money, elephants, 
14. As Chulalongkorn, 135, indicates. The sequence of events presented here follows 
Chulalongkorn. The main weakness of this version of the tale is that events 
move too rapidly for th egeographical and human elements involved. Thus, fol-
lowing Chulalongkorn's version, it is but four years from the time of Wo's flight 
to Champasak in 1773 to his death in 1777 following the complex series of events 
related below. Archaimbault's 1741 date (p. 558), on the other hand, moves too 
slowly, over a space of almost forty years, and must meet the additional objection 
that the Burmese were in no position in 1741 to be active in Laos, as they were 
established only in Chiengsaen by 1741, and not in Chiengmai until earlf in the 
1760's (see Damrong, Thai rop phama, 297-338, esp. pp. 331-4; and Phraya 
Prachakit 454 6). The alternative to these two versions is that given by Mom 
Ammorawongwitchit, "Tamnan muang nakhon champasak [History of Cham-
. r pasak]," in Collected Chronicles, vol. 70 (Bangkok, 1941), 30-33 (hereafter cited 
J as TMNC), which dates Wo's flight from Nong Bua Lamphu in 1770 or 1171. 
If this date is correct, the Burmese would have arrived in Vientiane owing, not 
to the appeals of Wo and Ta for aid, but rather to the Luang Prabang invasion 
^^  of Vientiane. Since, however, the Burmese ar^said to have rushed back to 
Chiengmai following their siege of Luang Prabang (see note 11 above), even this ^ 
answer to the problem is not free from doubt. All that can be stated with any 
certainty is that Wo was expelled from Nong Bua Lamphu by a Vienliatje-
Burmese force, and at this time the Burmese forces returned to Chiengmai with 
. hostages from Vientiane. , i ; ^ . , 
15. Text in Maha Sila, 91-2. / : ^  \ 
16. Text in Maha Sila, 92. : ^ . . 
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horses, and soldiers. If Vientiane could supply these items, 
Taksin promised to rescue the Vientiane hostages in Ava. This 
message was sent with a large quantity of gifts, mostly textiles but 
including two rifles as well.^^ 
Siribunyasan's reply to this last letter displayed a mixed re-
action.^ ® He offered his daughter to Taksin, but stipulated that 
she must be sent for and escorted back to Thonburi. He also 
offered the Thai 500 oxcart loads of rice, but.^stated that Siam 
must fetch this as well. On the other hand, in order that he might 
have suitably-equipped troops for aiding the Siamese, he request-
ed that he be sent 2000 rifles. Evidently the King of Vientiane 
had accepted the fact of Siamese power, but his response to 
Taksin's request indicates that he wished to keep their relatibns 
on an equal basis. While he must have felt constrained to accept 
some of Siam's demands in view of the disparity in their military 
power, he attempted to gain some status in his own right by 
marrying his daughter to Taksin, and he also required that Siam 
make some efforts on his behalf. 
Taksin's response to this letter, written in September of 1775, 
was quite friendly.^^ He stated that his envoys would come to 
Vientiane to fetch the princess and the 500 cartloads of rice, and 
that in addition to sending the rifles, instructors would also be 
sent to teach the Lao soldiers their use. He added that the Siam-
ese army would soon be striking directly at Ava. This is, how-
ever, the last letter in this highly interesting correspondence which 
has been preserved. Relations were soon broken off, either due 
to a report from Luang Prabang that Vientiane was cooperating 
with the Burmese again and because the Lao did not subsequently 
aid in attacking the Burmese,^ ^ or due to subsequent events which 
touched off the Siamese invasion of Vientiane in 1778. Both 
reasons are equally likely, and either is sufficient. 
Before turning to the invasion of Vientiane, it is necessary to 
look first at the other Lao kingdoms. The annals of Luang Pra-
bang are virtually blank for this period, save for passing mention 
of the inauguration of friendly relations with Siam. Le Boulanger^i 
states that in 1774 the King of Luang Prabang solicited Taksin's 
protection and proposed a defensive alliance against the Burmese. 
The two published Luang Prabang chronicles, however, state that 
Taksin wrote to the King in 1774 asking that friendly relations 
be established, and that a mission from Luang Prabang signed 
17. Maha Sila, 95-7. 
18. Maha Sila. 99. 
19. Maha Sila. 99-100. 
20. Maha Sila, 100. 
21. Pages 155. 196-7. 
i J ^  ^  r~ 
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a treaty of alliance in Bangkok in 1776.22 In assessing this new 
direction in Taksin's foreign policy, several factors may. be perti-
nent. First, it may be that in resuming his correspondence with 
Vientiane in 1774, Taksin also took the opportunity to establish 
contact with Luang Prabang as part of his offensive against the 
Burmese strongholds in the north. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that King Tiao Vongsa heard of the correspondence be-
tween Taksin and Vientiane and wished to avoid complete isola-
tion. Finally, by 1776 Taksin may have been anticipating the 
invasion of Vientiane that came in 1778. Unfortunately, none 
of these possibilities can be confirmed with the evidence at hand. 
The principality of Champasak appears to have had consistent 
history of domestic political turmoil. Its ruler, Saiyakuman, was 
in constant conflict with the Uparat (or Viceroy). In 1758 the 
latter, Thammathewo, brought an army of supporters to attack the 
city, forcing Saiyakuman to flee to the village of, Don Mot Daeng, 
near the present city of Ubon. The Uparat was prevented from 
pursuing the ruler only by the efforts of their mother, who 
managed to settle their quarrel and obtain the restoration of 
Saiyakuman to his duties in the city.^ ^ 
The major cause of the 1778 Thai invasion of the Lao lands 
— according to the Thai annals — lay with the troublesome Wo, 
who had earlier fled to Champasak.^ ^ Saiyakuman established 
Wo and his entourage at the village of Ban Du Ban Kae. 
Informed of Saiyakuman's protection of the refugees, Siribunyasan 
prepared an army to attack the village. Concerned, no doubt, 
for the effects a Vientiane army might have on his own authority, 
Saiyakuman quickly dispatched a mission to Vientiane which 
secured the recall of the army and the opening of friendly rela-
tions between the Lao states.^ '^  Finally, in 1777, Wo and 
Saiyakuman quarrelled, and the former withdrew his followers 
and their families to the village of Don Mot Daeng (apparently 
a convenient refuge) ^nd, submitting tribute through the govern-
or of Nakhon Ratchasima, put himself under the suzerainty of 
the Siamese. > 
King Siribunyasan of Vientiane, hearing of Wo's quarrel with 
Saiyakuman, sent an army against Don Mot Daeng. Wo's appeals 
for help from Champasak and Nakhon . Ratchasima were not 
answered in time, and he was captured and executed by the Vien-
tiane force. His son, Thao Kham, and several other officials 
22. PMLP, 44-5; Damrong-PMLP, 254. ^ ^ 
23. TMNC, 29-30. ' ; ' . ^ 
24. Chulalongkorn, 135. Tocm, I, 143-4; gives 1771. following TMNC, 32. 
25. TMNC, 32. - -v -vy.,, •. - - — 
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caped, and sent a message to Nakhon Ratchasima asking that 
the Thai take revenge on Vientiane.^® 
Toem rightly points out^ '^  that Taksin would hardly have gone 
to war over such a minor personage as^ ^AVo. His invasion of 
Vientiane was rather another step to be taken towards the 
strengthening of Siam; a move indirectly against the Burmese, 
but also, as the addition of new vassals along the eastern frontier 
would appear to indicate, a precaution against~-auy. eventual 
troubles with Annam or Cambodia. Taksin had previously had 
pretexts for attacking Vientiane, but they had arisen at times when 
he was preoccupied with Burma. At this point, however, there 
was a temporary lull in the west,^ ^ and several pretexts upon 
which to base an invasion of Vientiane, including perhaps the 
accusation of Thai Kham that the Lao were in league with the 
Burmese, as well as the murder of a vassal. Wo. 
In November and December of 1778 the Thai armies moved 
out towards Vientiane. General Chakri took a force of 20,000 
men overland, while his brother, General Surasi, went to Cam-
bodia, where he raised a vassal naval force of 10,000 men and 
headed up the Mekong, capturing Champasak, Nakhon Phanom, 
and Nongkhai en route, as well as several smaller towns which 
were then vassals of Vientiane.^® The two forces joined in sub-
duing the small towns surrounding Vientiane and laid siege to 
the capital for four months. They finally stormed the city, aided 
by a small force dispatched by Luang Prabang, and captured 
many members of the ruling family, the city's prized Buddha 
images, the Phrabang and the Emerald Buddha,^ ® and a very large 
number of I^o families which were later settled in the region of 
Saraburi, northeast of Ayuthya.^^ ^.i^ig Siribunyasan, however, 
managed to escape to the town of Khamkoet, on the Vietnam 
border. Vientiane was left in charge of 'a prominent Vientiane 
general, Phraya Supho, and the Thai army returned home in 
April of 1779.32 
26. 
28. 
29. 
TMNC, 33. Maha Sila, 101-2, also states that Thao Kham suggested to Taksin 
that Vientiane was* cooperating with the Burmese. Cf. also Chulalongkorn, 128. 
27. Vol. I, 145-6. 
During the relatively quiet reign of King Singu in Burma, 1776-1782. Cf. Hall, 
Burma, 92. 
For this invasion, a standard source is the Royal Autograph Edition of the 
Thai annals: Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, ed. Phraratchaphongsawadan chabap 
phraratchahatlekha (Bangkok, 1962), II, 418-23. For an incompiete account of 
the procuring of the naval force in Cambodia, see J. Moura, Le Royaume dxi 
.i^v Cambodge (Paris, 1883), II, 91. Other accounts of the expedition may be found 
in Maha Sila, 101-2; Le Boulanger, 155-6; Toem, I,' 145-9; and TMNC, 33-4. 
30. Which were, as the Thai sources put it, "invited" to Thonburi. 
31. Maha Sila, 103. , ^ . -
32. The Thai annals state that there were two military expeditions in the Champa-
sak area during this period, but give Wo as the cause of neither. In addition 
to the major attack on Vientiane in 1778-9, in the course of which Champasak 
?0 
As a result of this invasion, both Vientiane and Champasak 
lost their independence and their ruling families and temporarily 
were governed by military commanders, although, at. least in the 
case of Vientiane, the ruler was indigenous to the city. As for 
Luang Prabang, which had aided in the capture of Vientiane, 
it too became more closely aligned with the Siamese. Both the 
Luang Prabang chronicles state that Luang Prabang entered the 
battle at the request of General Chakri,^^ and that subsequently 
Luang Prabang either "asked to be allowed to become" a vassal 
of Siam, or "was forced to accept Siamese suzerainty.''®^ All three 
I.ao kingdoms thus came under the spreading umbrella of Thai 
power. 
IL Laos to the Accession of Chao Ann, 1780-1804 
The sources which deal with the 1778 Thai invasion of Vien-
tiane offejr interesting material relating to the differing relation-
ships holding between Bangkok and the Lao States on the one 
hand (Vientiane, Luang Prabang, and Champasak) and between 
Bangkok and the northeast provinces of old Siam on the other. 
While these relationships are by no means clearly defined, and 
in practice varied greatly, certain general characteristics are readi-
ly apparent. 
During the period with which this paper is concerned, the 
area in presei. \y Northeast Thailand under direct Thai admi-
was taken, the Moyal Autograph Edition, II, 414-5, and the Phraratchaphongsa-
wadan krung thonburi [Royal Chronicles of the Thonburi Period] (Collected 
Chronicles, vol. 65, Bangkok, 1960), 83, mention a military expedition, in the 
Champasak area in 1777. This expedition was undertaken, they state to put 
down a revolt of a muang, Nang Rong, tributary to Khorat, whose ruler 
allegedly was conspiring with the Uparat of Champasak and the governor and 
Uparat of Attapu (tributary to Champasak). According to these accounts, the 
Thai sent an army to the area, led by General Chakri, which executed the 
governor of Nang Rong and then captured Champasak, Khong, and Attapu and 
executed the plotters. The Thai army returned home in April of 1777. This 
story is corroborated by the memoirs of a contemporary. Princess Narinthewi 
(Chulalongkorn, 6-7, 124 ff.), who remembered the army returning from Champa-
sak in September and setting out again in December for Vientiane. 
The Uparat of Champasak and the rulers of Attapu, mentioned in the Thai 
account as having been executed in 1777, were the reported grounds for another 
Thai expedition against Champasak early in the following decade, mentioned in 
TMNC, 34-5. The same people and events are thus reported by both sides, but 
the three Champasak annals Archaimbault used place the event after the 1778 
invasion, while the Thai annals place it before the invasion. I have chosen lo '' 
follow the Champasak chronology, primarily because of an editorial footnote to 
the Thonburi Annals, p. 83, which notes that as late as 1780 General Chakri 
was referred to, in a document still existent, as "Chaophraya Chakri," and not 
"Chaophraya Mahakasatsuk," the title which the Thai annals state was conferred 
on him following the 1777 invasion of Champasak, thus indicating that the 
expedition involving the Uparat of Champasak may not h ,^ve taken place untill 
the following decade. 
S3. PAfLP, 45-6; Damrong-FAfLP, 254-5. 
34. Maha Sila, 102-3. V ^ I 
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nistrative control greatly expanded, to cover virtually all of the 
Thai Northeast, except for a narrow band along the Mekong. By 
the end of the First Reign (1782-1809) this area included such 
viuang (town/province) as Sisaket, iJbon, Yasothon, Roi-et, Kala-
sin, and Khonkaen, as well as many more towns clustered more 
closely around Khorat. The governors (chaomuang), of these 
towns were quite independent within their own jurisdictions. 
They did not, however, have the power to execute, ^ evildoers, to 
appoint higher officials within the muang, or to make war. Such 
decisions were referred to Khorat or Bangkok.^ ® Provinces in the 
Northeast were attached to various ministries and officials in 
Bangkok as a part of the financial support of the latter, and to 
them the muang had to render revenue and labour service. For 
such purposes, periodic censuses were made of every muang by 
officials from the capital. Their boundaries were set and, in this 
period, often shifted by Bangkok in order to create new muang 
in the area. A policy of the First Reign, continued by its success-
ors, was to reward chaomuang for increases of population and 
territory by awarding them, titles which reached as high as 
phroya^^ In general, in the sphere of administrative control, 
these Northeast provinces did not differ greatly from the rest of 
the Kingdom/^ 
The areas of Laos that came under the suzerainty of Bangkok 
in the First Reign enjoyed quite a different relationship with-
Siam. The powers of their rulers were very much greater. They 
had the powers of capital punishment, of making war with Thai 
consent, and of independently appointing all but the four high-
est officials of the realm, and, as documented in the cases of 
Chainpasak and Luang Prabang, these appointments were general-
ly made locally by a council of nobility and then submitted to 
Bangkok for approval. Their obligations to provide revenue and 
corvee labour were very much curtailed, and amounted to little 
more than an annual tribute of the "silver and gold trees" and 
providing armies in time of war. Each of the three Lao states 
had its own vassals and, to some extent, carried on limited inde-
pendent foreign relations. In short, the Lao areas were more 
properly "vassals," comparable to the Malay vassals of Bangkok, 
although because of the cultural affinities between Thai and Lao 
the relatiofiship was more open to the close ties of royal marriages, 
35. Toem, I, ' ' " • ' 
36. M. C. Sipi^&afEphansanoe Sonakun, Praxoatsat thai samai krung rattanakosin yuk 
rack,. .chofhs^p rang pThai History in the First Part of the Bangkok Period... 
• Dralt Ed i i j ^ i (Bangkok, 1958), 61. 
37. For tMs; sirciion, see Mom Animorawongwitchit, "Phongsawadan huamuang 
month©« isain [Chronicles of the Provinces on Monthon Isan]/' in Collected 
Chronicles, vol. 4 (Bangkok, 1915), 29-222» passim. i -
the education of I^o princes in Bangkok, and cultural and reli-
gious exchanges. 
Within this framework of relations there was, during the 1780's 
and '90's, considerable scope for Thai diplomatic and military 
initiative. Rama I came to the throne of Siam fresh from the 
invasion of Vientiane,®® and throughout his reign had occasion to 
deal with I^o affairs. The main features of his activity were 
the appointments of higher officials and rulers in several of the 
Lao states, and several cases of military intervention. 
In Champasak, Chao Saiyakuman, in the period following the 
Siamese invasion, was faced with a continuation of his old feud 
with the Uparat. The latter had died in 1767, but his influence 
in state affairs continued. Thao Kham Phong, a son of Phra Ta 
who had come to the area with Wo in 1773, had married the 
daughter of the late Uparat and proceeded to gather a strong 
following^ Saiyakuman was then forced to award Thao Kham 
Phong an important military position in charge of a large area 
around present-day Ubon. Then, in 1780, the governor of Attapu, 
Chao O, a son of the late Uparat, together with his brother, was 
accused of oppressing the population under his control and was 
captured and executed by a force from Champasak. Hearing of 
this incident, Bangkok sent a royal commissioner to Champasak 
in 1782 who was to bring Saiyakuman and his court back to 
Bangkok for examination, but as Saiyakuman fell ill along the 
way, he was permitted to return home.®® ^ 
In 1791 a man popularly believed to possess magical powers 
gathered together a folloAving and attacked Champasak, spurred by 
news of the ruler's illness. While the city was surrounded, Saiya-
kuman died at the age of 81 after a reign of 54 years. Informed 
of the incident, Siam sent a force from Khorat to subdue the 
rebels; but Thao Kham Phong and Thao Fai Na, the son of Wo, 
were able to put down the rebellion and executed the rebel leader. 
When the Thai forces arrived they reconstituted the local govern-
ment, moved the capital north to the present Muang Kao Khan 
Koeng, and appointed Thao Fai Na ruler of Champasak, under 
the name of Chao Phra Wisaiyarat Khattiyawongsa.^® , 
WW 
38. 
39; 
He was the former General Chakri. ' ' ^ 
There is no mention of this episode in the Thai annaU (see note 32 above). 
For this paragraph, see TMNC, 34-5. 
TMNC, 35-6. Chao Prommathewanukhro, "Tarnnan muang nakhon champasak 
[History of Champasak]/' Collected Chronicler, vol. 70. 57-8 (cited as Phrom-
mathewanukhro-TA/ATC), states that'Saiyakuman died upon his return to Cham-
pasak in 1782 (see para, above), and that the Siamese were unable to choose 
a new ruler from among the three members of the ruling family they had 
removed to Bangkok. The leadership vacuum was filled, the account relates, first 
by the "man with magical powers," and then by the sons of Wo and Ta, out 
of whom Thao Fai Na, after a visit to Bangkok, was appointed chaomuaiig. 
40. 
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Vientiane, however, was quite another matter. After the inva-
sion of Vientiane in 1778, all the members of the royal family 
of the state— with tlie important exception of Chao Siribunyasan 
— were brought to Bangkok, and it was from this group of prison-
ers that the next three rulers of Vientiane were chosen. 
Siribunyasan returned to Vientiane in 1781, and appears to 
have regained control over the state, although the sources do not 
present any clear account gf how this came about^ At his death 
in 1781, the Siamese enthroned Chao Nanthasen, son of Siribun-
yasan, as ruler of Vientiane, and returned the Phrabang.'*^ 
Luang Prabang, after having entered into more direct relations 
with Siam at the time of the invasion of Vientiane in 1778, had 
broken off relations with Burma. It annually sent the "silver 
and gold trees'' to Siam, and maintained tributary relations with 
China.^ 2 After a short interregnum following the death of King 
Tiao Vongsa, the nobles of the kingdom finally agreed in 1791 
on the choice of his son, Anuruttha, to succeed him, but before 
enthroning him sent a mission to Bangkok to secure Siam's 
approval and recognition for their nominee.^^ 
I^ss than a year later,'*^ Chao Nanthasen reported to Bangkok 
that Anuruttha was conspiring with Burma against Vientiane, 
and shortly thereafter received authorization to attack Luang Pra-
bang.'*® The Vientiane army laid siege to the city for two weeks 
and was unable to penetrate the city walls. The commander of 
the invading forces then sent a letter to Queen Thaenkham, 
widow of King Suryavong, promising to make her ruler of Luang 
41. Both Hall, A History of Southeast Asia (London, 1955), 381, and Le Boulanger, 
157, sfate that Siribunyasan, voluntarily returned to Vientiane and submitted to 
Siam on learning that his children were being well-treated in Bangkok. The 
•"Short Chronicle of Vientiane" ("Phongsawadan yo muang wiangchan," Collected 
Chronicles, vol. 70, 183) states only that Siribunyasan returned to the city in 
December of 1780. The chronicles of the First Reign of the Chakri Dynasty of 
Siam state that Siribunyasan returned to Vientiane and killed Phraya Supho, 
whom the Thai had left in control, and took over the city. Officials opposed 
lo him then reported the event to Bangkok, whereupon the Thai king appointed 
Nanthasen ruler of Vientiane. "Not long afterwards," the source reports, Siri-
bunyasen died. Chaophraya Thiphakorawong, Phraratchaphongsawadan krung 
rattanahosm ratchakan thi 1 (Bangkok, 1962), 45-6. .Hereafter cited as First 
Reign Chronicle. 
42. Bamrong-PA/LiP, 255, states that tribute was sent to China every five years until 
1782, when the interval was changed to ten years, at an increased rate of tribute. 
The dates given in the Chinese sources, however, indicate that this change took 
place before 1760. Cf. J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, "On the Ch'ing Tributary 
System," HJAS 6 (1941), 166-8. 
43. Maha Sila, 136; Damrong-PMLP, 256; and Ren6 de Berval, Kingdom of Laos 
(Saigon. 1959), 42. 
44. Or perhaps still in 1791. 
45. Both Le Boulanger, 157, 198-200; and Hall, History, 381. state that the attack 
was made on the initiative of Nanthasen because of "dynastic troubles" in Luang 
Piabang. The Thai sources, on the other hand, state that the attack was made 
for the purjxise stated and that it was authorized, first Reign Chronicle^ 182-3. 
Cf. also Sipphanphansanoe, 61; and Maha Sila, 110. 7 * ^ 
• >V. \ : 24 . •• 
Prabang if she would open the gates of the city. With the aid 
of a friend in the city's garrison this was done, and the city fell 
to Vientiane. As in other cases of suspected treason/® Chao 
Anuruttha and his family were sent to Bangkok.'*^ Evidently out 
of respect for Siam, however, Vientiane did not attempt to unite 
the two kingdoms, and only annexed the Hua Phan cantons at 
this time.^ ® 
In 1794, a member of the Luang Prabang royal family, set to 
rule over the city by Vientiane, sought the release of Chao Anu-
ruttha from prison in Siam, doing so through the good offices of 
China. The Chinese sent envoys to Bangkok via Hsen Wi and 
down the Nan River. They were granted an audience with 
Rama I and obtained Anuruttha's release. Orders then were 
sent to Vientiane that all families who had been deported from 
Luang Prabang in the 1792 invasion be returned to their homes, 
and Anuruttha and his family were sent home laden with gifts.^^ 
At about this time^ ® Chao Nanthasen of Vientiane was recalled 
to Bangkok. Some sources state that he lost his throne simply 
because he did not rule well;^^ but most mention that he was 
accused of conspiring with the ruler of Nakhon Phanom to revolt 
against Siamese domination. Both were summoned to Bangkok 
for an investigation, and while in Bangkok, Chao Nanthasen 
died.«2 
His brother, Chao Inthavong, was sent from Bangkok to suc-
ceed him. He was assisted by his younger brother, Chao Anu-
vong (or Anu), who was made Uparat. He immediately began 
to render his obligations to his suzerain in full. Anu was sent 
to command Lao contingents fighting at the side of the Thai 
army in 1795, 1798, 1799, and 1803. Anu distinguished himself 
in these campaigns, most of which were against the Burmese, and 
was twice commended by King Rama L The reign of Chao. 
Inthavong marked a high point in Thai-Vientiane relations^ on 
46. E.g. the Uparat of Champasak at an earlier date. ^^  
47. Maha Sila, 110; Sipphanphansanoe, 61; First Reign Chronicle, 183. 
48. Berval, 42. ' 
49. PMLP, 49-50; and Damrong-PMLP, 257-8 give this story in fiill, with some 
variations. The Chinese embassy seems unlikely, especially by the route men-
tioned. The First Reign Chronicle states only that Anuruttha was later restored 
to his throne, without mentioning the circumstances. 
50. The First Reign Chronicle mentions this event after discussing the restoration Y-k 
of Anuruttha, while the actual dates mentioned for the events would put them 
in reverse order. Le Boulanger states that Chao Nanthasen was recalled because 
of the attack on Luang Prabang, and at that time Anuruttha was restored to 
his throne. 
51. E.g. Sipphanphansanoe, 61. » f -
52. First Reign Chronicle, 211-12; Maha Sila, 110; and Phraya Chanthangonkham, 
"rhongsawadan muang nakhon phanom sangkhep [Condensed Chronicles of 
NalOion Phanom]," in Collected Chronicles, vol. 70, 239. 
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this account, at any rate: the last two times Lao soldiers had parti-
cipated in the Thai-Burmese wars were in 1765 and 1774, both 
times on the Burmese side.- Relations appeared to be perfectly 
harmonious, although Le Boulanger expresses some doubt as to 
this conclusion: 
Politically clever, [Anu] hid his true sentiments and main-
tained the attitude of deference to his suzerain which cir-
cumstances had imposed on him. H^ Acquired the confi-
dence of the Thai court, and the annals of the Thai 
recognized his courage and the incontestable services which 
he rendered to Siam for about five years. When Chao In 
died, he was immediately appointed as his successor.^ ® 
Vientiane, however, also continued to carry on relations with 
Vietnam. Some of her vassal towns had been paying equal tribute 
to Annam and Vientiane as long ago as 1780^ ^ and in 1790 Vien-
tiane was attacked by a joint Vietnamese-Xieng Khouang force, 
which appears to have resulted in Chao Inthavong sending tribute 
to Annam as well.^^ Vientiane forces cooperated with Gia-long 
against the Tay-son rebellion, and in 1798 Vietnamese officers 
came to Vientiane to aid the Lao army, later accompanying it on 
missions against rebel remnants. Vientiane sent tribute missions 
to Gia-long in 1801 and 1802; and upon his accession, in 1804, 
Chao Anu immediately notified the court at Hue.^ ® It appears 
possible, then, that Vientiane's relations with Vietnam were near-
ly as close as its relations with Siam, although the Siamese sources 
give little such information. 
Finally, in 1804, Chao Inthavong died. The King of Siam 
sent presents by an embassy to his cremation, and named the 
Uparat, Chao Anu, to succeed him.®^ - ^ 
In summary, then, during this period Siam's position in Laos, 
was maintained by both diplomatic and military means. Bangkok 
named the rulers of Champasak (1791) and Vientiane (1781, 
1794/5, and 1804), and approved the choice of a rule for Luang 
Prabang (1791). Siam repeatedly took measures to suppress sus-
pected revolts in Laos, and, whether as a conscious policy or not, 
53. Le Boulanger, 159. On the content of this paragraph, see also Maha Sila, 111. 
54. And probably before. Cf. Piene Grossin, Notes sur VHlitoire de la Province de 
Cammon (Laos) (Hanoi. 1933), 17. 
55. First Reign Chronicle, 177. This attack may have been provoked by a prior 
attack by Vientiane on Xieng-Khouang in 1787, occasioned by the latter's sub-
mission to Vietnam, although none of the other sources mention this. Maha Sila, 
109-10. Cf. also Eugene Picanon, Le Laos Fnincais (Paris, 1901), 174-5. 
56. Charles B. Mayljon, Hisloire Moderne du Pays d'Annam {1593-1820) (Paris, 
1919), 385; Le Thanh Khoi, Lc Viet-Nam. Hisloire et Civilisation (Paris, 1955), 
336; and, for the date of the accession of Chao Anu, Bui Quang Tung, "Chao 
" V Anou, roi dc Vientiane; a travers les documents vietnamiens/* BSEI 33 (1958), 401. 
57. First Reign Chronicle, 274. ^ 
.jjixxi^x i^LyiJ 
maintained the political fragmentation of Laos. During the 
reign of Chao Ann of Vientiane, this was to be seriously threat-
ened. 
TIL The Reign of Chao Ann, 1804-1827 
Although his reign was to bring about the destruction of his 
state, Chao Anu came to the throne under most favourable 
auspices.^ ® He was highly respected and honoured by the Siam-
ese for his loyal services in the Thai wars with Burma, and he 
received his investiture at the hands of Siam. Much of the early 
part of his reign was spent in expanding and beautifying his 
capital. He constructed a new royal palace, bridges, and religi-
ous monuments."® In this aspect of his rule, Anu appears to have 
been acting in the best traditions of Buddhist monarchy. 
In the political realm, however, Anu's actions and policies 
admit -t)f less certain interpretation. Some writers, notably Le 
Boulanger, have construed virtually every action of Anu from 
1794 as preparation for the rebellion of 1827. It is possible that 
from his youth Anu harbored a grand design for restoring the 
Kingdom of Lan Chang, but lacking any reliable indications of 
Anu's intentions, at least for the early part of his reign, his actions 
and policies must be taken on their face value. 
Early in his reign, Anu reaffirmed the old tribute relationship 
between Vientiane and Annam. Tribute was regularized by a 
mission sent in 1804 to notify Gia-long of Anu's accession.®^ It 
was to be sent every three years, and to consist of male elephants, 
rhinoceros horns, ivory, and cinnamon. When the tribute for 
1808 did not arrive punctually, Gia-long sent a mission demand-
ing it, which quickly provoked the desired response. There 
were only three more tribute missions, in 1811-12, 1814, and 1817, 
and none after that.^ '^  
r The Luang Prabang Annals record very little for this interim 
period. They mention that King Anuruttha died in 1815, and 
that King Rama II supported the Uparat as his successor. The 
latter was enthroned in 1816 as Chao Mangthaturat, and was, in , 
the following years, to show himself a devoted friend of the Thai 
monarchs.^ 2 ^ 
Champasak, on the other hand, figures prominently in the 
annals of the period. Jn 1811®^  the ruler^f Champasak died, and ^ 
— — 
58. T o paraphrase Le Boulanger, 159. . . , ' 1- ' 
59. Malia Sila, 111; Short Chronicle of Vientiane, 181-204. . J ^ 
60. Bui Quang Tung, 401. Cf. also Lc Boiilangcr, 160-1 fii, , / 
61. Maybon, 385; Le Thanh Khoi, 336. . - t * - J t r ^ " ' ^ \ 
62. PMLP, 51. - " ' .r l . 
6S. TMNC, 37; Phrommathcwanukhro-7'i\/NC, 59, says 1810. . , , iv*^  
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a son of the former ruler, Saiyakuman, was named to replace 
him, but ilie latter died within three days. King Rama I sent a 
high ranking official to his cremation. This envoy was given a 
precious crystal image of the Lord Buddha as a present for King 
Rama I, but returned to Bangkok without installing a ruler in 
Champasak. Finally in 1813 Chao Manoi was appointed by Siam 
to rule the state, with a descendant of the rival Thammathewo's 
family as Uparat. Chao Manoi and his Uparat-^vere later involv-
ed in a dispute which was mediated by Bangkok and resulted in 
the jailing of the latter. Clearly Siam's control over Champasak 
was stronger than that over either of the other two principalities.®^ 
In 1819 a revolt broke out in the territory of Champasak among 
the Kha peoples, led by a renegade monk named Sa. Sa claimed 
magical powers, which he demonstrated by using a mirror to 
create fire. Gathering a large number of followers, he marched 
on Champasak. Chao Manoi put up very little resistance, and 
the city was quickly taken, the ruling families escaping to the 
region of Ubon. Troops from Ubon and Khorat quickly retook 
the city, but were unable to capture the monk Sa, and returned 
home, sending Chao Manoi to Bangkok, where he later died. Sa 
was finally captured by a force from Vientiane, led by Anu's son, 
Yo. . 
The Siamese were confronted with the problem of reinstating 
strong rule in Champasak. Chao Manoi and his predecessors had 
proved themselves too weak to withstand even internal revolt. 
During a lengthy discussion in Bangkok over the naming of a 
ruler, Chao Anu urged the naming of his son to the post. Chao-
phraya Chetsadabodin (later Rama I I I ) was in favour of such 
an appointment, and prevailed over Prince Phithaksamoritri, who 
argued that such an appointment would dangerously strengthen 
Vientiane. The Thai were forced to make the decision on the 
basis of political and military requirements, and so chose Yo, 
who, it was felt, would be strong enough — with his father's help, 
if necessary — to prevent Annamese encroachment in the Mekong 
valley.®^ 
Following the Champasak episode, Anu began to prepare for 
revolt. He instructed liis son, Chao Yo, to fortify his territory®® 
and began a campaign to obtain at least the neutrality of Luang 
Prabang in the event of conflict with Siam. In 1820 he sent 
envoys to Chao Mangthaturat of Luang Prabang to propose the 
64. Maha Sila, 144; TMNC, 37-8. "" 
65. Prince Dararong Rajanubhab, cd., Phraratchaphongsawadan krung rattannkosin 
ratchakan thi 2 [Royal Chronicle of the Second Reign of the Bangkok Period] 
(Bangkok, 1916), 270-4; TMNC, 38>9; Le lioulanger, 160; Maha Sila, 144-5. 
66. TMNC, 39; Le Boulanger, 161. 
restoration of friendly relations between the two states and "the 
union of their forces against the suzerainty of the West [Siam] 
whose power was growing in a menacing fashion."®^ Chao Mang-
thaturat refused, but in the following year Anu again sent a 
mission in an attempt to bribe him. This mission seems at least 
to have won Mangthaturat's neutrality, for he did not report the 
incidents to Bangkok, and over the following years maintained 
envoys in both Bangkok and Vientiane to keep him informed of 
developments.®® # 
The rulers of both Vientiane and Luang Prabang came to 
Bangkok for the cremation of Rama II in 1825. Mangthaturat 
of Luang Prabang handed over the administration of his state 
to senior officials and came to Bangkok bearing tribute. In a 
rather curious gesture, he asked the permission of King Rama I I I 
to enter a monastery to make merit in recognition of the favours 
which Rama I and Rama II had shown Luang Prabang. He 
stayed in the monastery for a year and wished to stay longer, but 
an epidemic broke out in Luang Prabang in 1826, and he asked 
to be allowed to return home. Upon his departure. King 
Rama I I I bestowed upon Mangthaturat "the five insignia of 
kingship'' in recognition of his great loyalty to Siam. Leaving 
behind two of his younger sons, whom he had enrolled in the 
Royal Pages Corps, Mangthaturat returned to Luang Prabang.'® 
Chao Anu also came to Bangkok for the royal cremation. His 
actions there show some of the seeds of the rebellion which fol-
lowed his return home. First, following the cremation, some of 
the Lao in Anu's entourage were called up for the Thai corvee, 
and put to work cutting palm trees at Suphanburi.''® Secondly, 
Anu made a number of demands on Rama III, acting on the 
assumption that he was an important vassal of Siam and a neces-
sary ally, particularly at a time when it appeared that Siam was 
threatened by British actions in Burma and Malaya and by Viet-
namese pressure on Cambodia.'^ ^ Anu asked that the Lao dancers 
and artisans in the royal service be returned, but he was given 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
Le Boulangcr, 201. 
Le Boiilanger, 201-2. 
Damrong,-PAlLP, 261-2. The five royal insignia are the golden slippers, the 
royal staff or baton, the sceptre or sword, the state crown, and the fly whisk. 
Cf. also Toem, 154. It is possible that Chao Mangthaturat stayed in Bangkok 
at this time to avoid any involvement in Anu's forthcoming revolt, and returned 
home only when the danger of revolt appeared past —perhaps when the rumor 
of a British invasion had died out. 
Maha Sila, 113; and Chaophraya Thiphakorawong, Phraratchaphongsaii'adan 
krung rattanakosin ratchakan thi i [Royal Chronicle of the Third Reign of Ibc 
Bangkok Period] (Bangkok, 1938), 24. 
Le Boulangcr, 166; Thailand, Krom Sinlapakon, comp., Chottriaihet ruang prop 
khahot wiangchan [Documents Concerning the Suppression of the Vientiane 
Rebellion] (Bangkok, 1926), 6; and Tocm, I, 154-5. 
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only one singer.''^  jj^ requested that the Im families who 
had beea deported from Vientiane in 1778-9 and settled in Sara-
buri— amounting to so]-e ten thousand persons— be returned, 
but as this would leave a large depopulated area near the capital, 
tl^ e request was refused.'^ The denial of his requests and the 
treatment of members of his entourage must have convinced Anu 
that his value to Siam Avas not as high as he had supposed. In 
addition, he may have taken offense at the favour^^hown to Chao 
Mangthaturat of lAiang Prabang in response to the latter's sub-
missive behaviour. 
Anu returned to Vientiane and began to plan his revolt. He 
mended his fences with Annam and appears to have relied upon 
Vietnamese support in the event that he should require it."^ ** He 
called together the nobles of the state and outlined his plans. 
He pointed out that a new and inexperienced ruler was on the 
throne in Siam and that the Thai armies were weak. The gov-
ernor of Nakhon Ratchasima was absent, and this was the only 
town along the route to Bangkok that could make any show of 
resistance. His most convincing argument, however, consisted 
of a fresh rumour from Bangkok to the effect that the British 
were sending a naval force against Bangkok.'^ Vientiane, he 
explained, could send an army through the Thai Northeast, using 
the rumour as an excuse, stating that the Lao force was going 
to the aid of Siam."^ He envisaged a lightning campaign for loot 
and captives, ^vith its first objective the repatriation of the Lao 
settlers in the Saraburi region, and he did not intend to occupy 
Bangkok for any length of time. In late January 1827, the Lao 
troops began their attack from Vientiane and Champasak, the 
latter army under the command of Chao YoJ^ 
In a letter written to Bangkok after the start of the rebellion. 
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and comp., Khao ton ton ratchakan thi 3 [News of the Beginning of the Third 
Reign] (Bangkok. 1932). 5. 
76. Chao Anu'd use of this rumor is shown in a curious letter he wrote King 
Rama II I from Nakhon Ratchasima dated 26 January 1827. in which he stated 
that he was on his way to Bangkok with a large anny to defend the city against 
a joint British-Burmese attack. He admitted that he was doing so without 
' the King*s orders, knowingly risking the death penalty. Thailand, Krom Sinla-
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Chao Mangthaturat reported having received a diplomatic mis-
sion from Vientiane in 1826. The mission had brought word 
that the British and Burmese were attacking Bangkok, and that 
Vientiane was going to the aid of the Siamese and needed rein-
forcements from Luang Prabang.'^ ^ Mangthaturat stated that he 
had not believed the story, and had sought the counsel of his 
nobles in working out some stratagem to stall the Vientiane 
envoys. He told the latter that he would send troops, but that 
they would be late, and in the interval sent word by his son to 
Bangkok of Vientiane's intentions. Not long afterwards he re-
ceived a message from the town of Nan, stating that it had been 
requested by Bangkok to assist in attacking Vientiane. Mangtha-
turat joined his small force with the Nan troops and provided 
supplies for the Thai army in their campaign, but his general 
participation in putting down the revolt was minimal.^® The 
task of pacifying the Lao states, from Champasak in the south to 
the Hua Phan cantons and Luang Prabang in the north, was 
carried out on a massive scale by the armies of Siam, which gain-
ed at this time an overwhelming predominance in Laos which 
lasted until the last years of the century. 
Conclusion 
Viewed within its historical context, the Vientiane rebellion 
comes into clearer focus as the logical consequence of growing 
Thai domination in Laos. While earlier Thai interference in 
Lao affairs had been undertaken largely as a defense against the 
Burmese, and seems to have been accepted by Vientiane and 
Luang Prabang as such, the character- of Siamese control was 
gradually broadened and came to be supported by the full mili-
tary strength of Siam. By the beginning of the 19th century, 
Siam began to focus her attention on her eastern frontiers, and 
Laos became a major scene of Thai activity. 
In his attempt to resist growing Siamese encroachment in Laos, 
as well as to check its continued political fragmentation, Chao 
Anu failed, and lost both his struggles. The Kingdom of Vien-
tiane was abolished, its population forcibly removed to Siam, and 
its former temtories fell under the direct control of Thai pro-
vincial administration. Likewise, the Thai installed a new line 
78. Vientiane Rebellion Documents, 64. 
79. For events in I.uang Prabong during this pericxl, see PMLP, 52-4; and Damrong-
PMLP, 202-4. The latter notes that in 1828 the Uparat of Luang Prabang was 
accused by the Thai of sheltering some fleeing Vientiane families, and was 
called to Bangkok where he soon died, Chao Suk Soem, the son of Mangtha-
turat who had carried the message to Bangkok concerning Ana's plans, was 
named to replace him. See also Vientiane Rebellion Documents^ 64-6; and I x 
Boulanger, 164-70, 201-3. 
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of rulers at Champasak and drew that state more firmly into the 
administrative system of the Thai iN'ortheast. Luang Prabang 
remained weak, to carry oa alone the shade of old Lan Chang. 
In its expansion into the Lao country, Siam overextended her-
self. While Laos prior to 1778 had felt the adverse effects of 
political disunity, the result of the 1827 rebellion was to accentu-
ate it further. The Thai had perpetuated the existence of a weak 
and divided Laos as an instrument of their own-self-strengthening. 
But such- a Laos was to prove more a liability than an asset in 
the years that were to follow. 
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THE BRITISH IN BANJARMASIN: 
AN ABORTIVE ATTEMPT AT SETTLEMENT 
1700 — 1707 
R. SUNTHARALINGAM 
Early in July 1698 the royal assent was received to an Act of 
Parliament which sanctioned the formation of a corporation, 
called the General Society, whose subscribers were vested with 
exclusive rights to trade in the East. The 'New' Company obtain-
ed its Royal Charter in September 1698 under the name of 'The 
English Company Trading to the Indies' and it was to supercede 
the 'Old' Company which was given a three-year grace to wind 
up its business. The 'Old' Company was expected to liquidate 
its East Indian assets, dismantle its Asian factories and recall its 
servants by September 1701.^  
The 'New' Company was seeking profitable trading connexions 
in the East and immediately its attention became focused on the 
China trade. It was generally believed that China was a huge 
market, capable of absorbing large quantities of British manu-
factures. Moreover, China was expected to furnish a variety of 
goods in which the Company could profitably invest. These 
hopes compelled the directors of the 'New' Company to consider 
the establishment of permanent factories in China, and in 1699, 
a China Presidency was formally constituted. 
The desire to develop trade with China elevated Borneo to a 
position of importance to the Company. A half-way station be-
tween India and China became a necessity, and Borneo, partly 
by virtue of its geographical position but largely on account of 
it being on the periphery of Dutch interest, became the obvious 
choice. In April 1699 Henry Watson and Captain Cotesworth 
were furnished with instructions to establish a factory at Banjar-
masin, a mission successfully accomplished in the following year,® 
It is with the fortunes of this factory that this paper is primarily 
concerned. ^ ^ ^ 
" -
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